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Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the
UN Security Council
B. GREGORY MARFLEET
Carleton College
COLLEENMILLER
University of Minnesota
The unanimous passage of Security Council Resolution 1441 marked
the onset of the most severe crisis of legitimacy that the United Nations
has faced in the post-Cold War period. While some have asserted that
the diplomatic clashes between erstwhile allies France and the United
States were inevitable given the rise of American unipolarity, an analysis
of events leading to the failed US attempt to gain a second resolution
reveals that the outcome was among the least preferred for both par-
ticipants. Using the Verbs In Context system, we conduct a computer-
based content analysis of the public statements of the United States and
French leaders. Our findings suggest that the diplomatic breakdown was
exacerbated by each leaders’ elevated sense of control over the situation
and their inaccurate perception of their opponent’s preferences.
November 8, 2005, will mark the third anniversary of the passing of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1441 (UNSCR 1441), and the end of thirty-six difficult
months for the United Nations (UN) and its main security arm. Ironically, the
outward comity exhibited during the unanimous passage of the resolution masked
the onset of a crisis of legitimacy that was the longest and most extensive that the
UN has faced in the post-Cold War period. This crisis reached its peak less than 150
days after passage of UNSCR 1441 when the frustrated president of the United
States abandoned his attempt to gain Security Council approval for a second res-
olution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Claiming justification for the war
in the wording of the November decree, President George W. Bush opted to invade
with a ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ rather than face defeatFeither from a veto by one
or more permanent UNSC members or an embarrassing failure to muster the
minimum number of supporting votes.
The legality of the invasion of Iraq that began 48 hours after Bush’s speech will
long be a matter of debate. The fact that the world’s most important security
institution had been marginalized by the events leading up to the war seems ir-
refutable. In the minds of some observers, the blow sustained by the UN and the
Atlantic alliance was more critical than just being shunted aside (Safire 2003; Glen-
non 2003). Analysis of the aftermath of the ‘‘Trans-atlantic Train Wreck’’ and its
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lasting impact on the UN had already commenced as coalition forces consolidated
their position in Iraq following a remarkably brief conventional war.1 The tone of
the earliest analyses was generally not optimistic. Shortly after the second resolution
debacle, even UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed doubts about the UN’s
future. Reflecting on the war in Iraq and the problem of extended subregional
conflict in Africa, he observed that ‘‘[m]any of us sense that we are living through a
crisis of the international system’’ and suggested that events may ‘‘force us to ask
ourselves whether the institutions and methods we are accustomed to are really
adequate to deal with all the stresses of the last couple of years’’ (Barringer 2003).
Although uncertainty regarding the effects of the clash between permanent
members of the UNSC over Iraq has lingered, there is cause for some optimism
about the UN’s future. Secretary Annan presciently appended his July comment
with the remark that those who dismiss the UN too readily ‘‘had to be careful
because they may need the UN soon’’ (Barringer 2003). Recent developments
surrounding the handover of Iraqi sovereignty appear to validate this prediction as
post-transition emphasis on assembling multilateral economic support for recon-
struction in Iraq, and calls for UN reform may gradually rehabilitate the institution.
Ultimately, the UN is the only international institution that is both universal in its
membership and unrestricted in its policy scope, and these features make it central
to any sustained multilateral activity (Tharoor 2003).
Post-train-wreck analysts, left metaphorically sifting through the ashes of the
Security Council’s spectacular meltdown, have started to turn their attention away
from speculation about what the consequences of the disaster might be to an iden-
tification of the cause. Why did the ‘‘train wreck’’ in the Security Council occur?
One of the first prominent attempts to explain the council’s failure was offered by
Michael Glennon, who attributes the ‘‘dramatic rupture’’ to ‘‘geopolitical forces too
strong for a legalistic institution to withstand’’ (2003:16). He suggests that these
forces were rooted in the end of the Cold War and the rise of American unipolarity,
that they were magnified by the events of September 11, 2001 (which he claims
stiffened American unilateralism), and that the emergence of these factors signaled
the ‘‘beginning of the end’’ of a grand, post-World War II experiment that tried
(but failed) to restrain power with law.
However, Glennon’s explanation as to why the UNSC failed is hardly an expla-
nation at all. Displaying a degree of structural determinism rarely evinced today by
even the most unalloyed neo-realists, he asserts that the rupture was inevitable: ‘‘the
fate of the council had long been sealed’’ (2003:18). To support this contention, he
evaluates the range of possible outcomes for the diplomatic standoff and then
concludes that, in the face of American determination to act, the Security Council
had ‘‘no good option.’’ Had it ignored the situation, it would have been sidelined.
Had it tried to block the use of force, it would have been deadlocked. Had it
acquiesced to US demands, it would have ‘‘seemed to rubber-stamp what it could
not stop’’ (Glennon 2003:26). In short, the council was doomed.
Researchers in the field of foreign policy analysis have traditionally been skeptical
about structurally deterministic explanations. As Harold Sprout and Margaret
Sprout argued in their seminal work ‘‘Environmental Factors in the Study of In-
ternational Politics,’’ policy choices are made by decision makers and external fac-
tors are related to these decisions ‘‘only by being perceived and taken into account
in the policy-making process’’ (1957:318). There are many reasons to believe that a
1 ‘‘The Transatlantic Train WreckFPicking up the Pieces’’ was the title of a conference sponsored by the
Bertelsmann Foundation Center for Applied Policy Research German Marshall Fund of the United States Trans-
atlantic Conference held in Tremezzo, Italy, June 11–13, 2003. The findings of the conference are available at http://
www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2003/2003_tremezzo_outcome.pdf. See also Mortimer (2003) and Franck
(2003). For a discussion of the Transatlantic tensions, see Gordon (2003), Lambert (2003), and Asmus (2003).
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decision maker’s mental representation of the operational environment could fail to
correspond to an external observer’s objective assessment of the same. Jervis
(1979), Vertzberger (1990), and others have detailed numerous factors, including
perceptual biases and information processing failures, that might generate incon-
gruities between the external world of decision makers and the ‘‘worlds in their
minds.’’
While hindsight may lead us to conclude that a particular outcome seemed in-
evitable, the indeterminate nature of the relationship between external factors and
foreign policy choices suggests that, in crafting an explanation for why a particular
historical episode turned out the way it did, we must pay attention to the percep-
tions of decision makers. Recognizing the contingent nature of perception and
policy choice, foreign policy researchers have adopted process-oriented modes of
explanation that seek to establish the links between antecedent environmental
conditions and foreign policy outputs (Hudson and Vore 1995). For foreign policy
researchers, the important questions to ask regarding the UNSC train wreck are:
did the actors involved recognize the nature of their predicament? If they did
arrive at an accurate assessment of their situation, was this insight immediate or
delayed? Did incongruities between external reality and mental models of the en-
vironment lead to policies that were unlikely to succeed, squandered resources,
created opportunity costs, or had unexpected and lingering consequences? Also of
concern to foreign policy researchers is the presence or possibility of a counter-
factual outcome. Could a decision maker who misperceived the objective environ-
ment, but who acted consistently with regard to his or her own mental model,
generate a historical outcome seemingly at odds with the ‘‘inevitable’’ result
suggested?
In this study, we investigate the bargaining process that led to the train wreck in
the Security Council. We begin with a post hoc analysis of the preferences of the two
involved parties (France and the United States), which suggests that deadlock was
indeed the likely outcome of the interaction and that this eventuality would lead the
United States to bypass the council altogether. We note, however, that this was not
the most desirable option for either side. We propose that, at the outset, neither
side recognized that the UNSC debacle was predestined to end as it did and that
both US and French leaders succumbed to errant subjective interpretations of the
bargaining situation. These misperceptions resulted, in part, from an environment
where expectations were unclear, where past behavior was unrepresentative of
current preferences, and where information was filtered through prior beliefs.
These mistakes led participants to overestimate their capacity to shape the final
outcome. We conclude that the magnitude of the UNSC crisis may have been
exaggerated by the tactics that each side used as they tried to achieve the diplomatic
victory they mistakenly believed they could attain.
In making this case, we begin our analysis with a brief review of the events
leading up to the US decision to bypass the UNSC. This narrative serves two
purposes. First, it allows us to develop a set of inferred preferences that captures
the most important and likely outcomes of the UNSC bargaining situation. Second,
it provides a reference to identify major crossroads, turning points, and policy shifts
over the five-month period prior to the invasion.
Following the narrative, we focus on determining whether or not these inferred
preferences were accurately reflected in the parties’ subjective interpretations of
the bargaining environment. To assess these subjective interpretations, we conduct
a computer-aided content analysis of the public statement of Presidents Bush and
Chirac using the Verbs in Context (VICS) coding system. The VICS scheme, de-
veloped by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998), is based on the operational code
construct as refined by Alexander George (1969). It generates indicators of the
philosophical and instrumental beliefs that reflect an actor’s impression of the na-
ture of the political environment as well as his or her propensities to select par-
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ticular tactics in response to these circumstances. Walker and Schafer (forthcoming)
have also developed a ‘‘theory of inferences about preferences’’ deduced from an
analysis of operational code scores and sequential decisions in 2  2 games. We use
the verbal acts (public speeches, press conferences, and interview remarks) of the
US and French presidents to build a model of each leader’s subjective beliefs about
the situation and his likely response to it. We approach this analysis as both a test of
the Walker and Schafer inferred-preferences model and as a technique to generate
insights into this particular historical failure in tactical bargaining.
Bargaining Events November 2002 to March 2003
The compromise passage of UNSCR 1441 allowed everyone to claim victory and to
argue for the astuteness of their policy position. The US. and British administra-
tions lauded the resolution for reflecting a new firmness with Baghdad, and sug-
gested that the council’s unanimity would facilitate recruiting allies for military
action should Iraq fail to cooperate with inspections (Kusovac and Beeston 2002).
Conversely, France emphasized the symbolic value of the resolution as a commit-
ment to work within the UN framework to strengthen the UN inspection regime
and highlighted the removal of elements of automaticity from the initial US pro-
posal (UNSC Record, 11/8/2002).
After 1441’s passage, each leader adapted his bargaining positions in response to
the other’s statements and pressed his agenda. President Bush, during a joint press
conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on November 21, expressed
little faith in the ability of inspections to bring about the disarmament of Iraq
(Bumiller 2002). President Chirac staked out his position by emphasizing diplo-
macy, multilateral behavior, patience, and opposition to any military action not
approved by the UNSC. The words of these two leaders were reinforced by the
actions they took.
Chirac initiated a diplomatic meeting with the leader of Mexico, a nonpermanent
member of the UNSC, where he and President Fox articulated their ‘‘common
approach to Iraq’’ and their opposition to ‘‘any unilateral attack’’ (French, Mexican
presidents underline common position in Iraq 2002). This November meeting
between France and Mexico kicked off a month-long campaign to lobby nonper-
manent members and build opposition to US–British calls for forceful disarmament
and regime change. The French President implored NATO members to abstain
from a commitment to any coalition outside of the UN and met with UN Secretary
General Annan, German Chancellor Schroeder, and Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad (on separate occasions) to emphasize support for UN weapons inspectors
who had entered Iraq in late November (Chirac holds talks with Syria’s al-Assad
2002). Establishing a pattern that would repeat until the spring, French diplomatic
success appeared to overshadow the US effort. Although the United States had
earned official NATO support for disarming Iraq, Germany’s indication that it
would not support any military action suggested that the NATO approval was
purely symbolic and without any serious backing (Bumiller 2002).
In December, inspection activities took center stage. Diplomatic activity focused
on the evaluation of the 12,000-page Iraqi-produced report detailing its weapons of
mass destruction programs. Again, the two sides clashed. While France advocated
slow-paced and careful scrutiny of the document, the US and U.K. government
positions were the polar opposite. Britain pressed the council by announcing a
‘‘contingency deployment’’ of forces toward the Persian Gulf in anticipation of
possible action against Iraq. The US leadership initiated limited air strikes against
military facilities in the ‘‘no-fly’’ zones in northern and southern Iraq, destroying an
anti-aircraft radar system southeast of Baghdad (Preston 2002).
The new year altered the Security Council dynamic with an infusion of new
members. In accordance with rules governing the service of nonpermanent mem-
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bers, five countries (Colombia, Ireland, Mauritius, Norway, and Singapore, who
had all voted in favor of UNSCR 1441) were replaced by Angola, Chile, Pakistan,
Spain, and Germany. Although Spain’s President Aznar had expressed pro-US
sentiment, Germany was clearly opposed (Germany Takes Center Stage 2003). The
other new members were unknown quantities with mixed motivations vis-a`-vis the
US and France. These uncommitted members became the focus of a diplomatic
battle between Chirac and Bush.
Perhaps as a tactical response to the reconstitution of the UNSC, or to allow time
for the inspectors who were presently operating in Iraq to find evidence of a
material breach that would force the Security Council’s hand, Bush adopted a less
insistent tone in January. During an address at Fort Hood military base, the US
president promised ‘‘deliberate’’ and ‘‘decisive’’ action but tempered his remarks by
insisting that ‘‘military force was this nation’s last option’’ (Bush 2003). This ap-
parently conciliatory pronouncement, which closely paralleled the French rhetoric,
was noted by Chirac. The French president reciprocated Bush’s signal by adopting
a harder line with Iraq. He echoed the US stance by warning Iraq of the conse-
quences that it faced if it failed to fully uphold UNSCR 1441 (Inspectors enter
Basra as leaders urge peaceful Iraq solution 2003).
This nascent convergence between US and French oratory was quickly displaced
by renewed polarization. On January 17, when UN weapons inspector Hans Blix
and International Atomic Energy Agency director Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei ap-
peared at a news conference in Paris to request more time for inspections, President
Chirac appeared in person at the event to support the extension request, which had
been prompted by the discovery of 11 empty chemical warheads (Bumiller and
Sciolino 2003). The response from the White House was 1801 from the French
response. The US administration touted the warheads as evidence of a material
breach of sanctions that sufficiently justified immediate military action. The pres-
sure for rapid action increased when, on January 20, US Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld declared that the decision on whether or not Iraq was in fact in violation
of 1441 would be made in ‘‘a matter of weeks, not in months or years’’ (Weisman
2003).
Not long after this exchange, and possibly as a reaction to the accelerating pace of
events, the threat of a French veto materialized. In response to a reporter’s ques-
tion concerning the hastening pace of military preparations and American pressure
on the Security Council, French Foreign Minster Dominique de Villepin refused to
rule out the possibility that France would vote against any military action (France
raises stakes for US with hint of UN veto 2003). In its position, France received
support from soon-to-be UNSC chair Germany. The German Foreign Minister
asserted that inspectors should have ‘‘all the time which is needed’’ to perform their
duties (Landler 2003). The threat of a veto substantially intensified the nature of
French opposition raising the stakes in the diplomatic standoff.
De Villepin’s statement, the tightness of Franco-German unity, and the obstacle it
presented to the United States fueled a growing war of words among top officials
from both sides of the Atlantic. On January 22, Secretary Rumsfeld berated the two
countries as ‘‘old Europe’’ (Purdum 2003). Despite pleas for civility by their re-
spective leaderships, the remark led senior officials in Paris and Washington to
exchange invectives that occasionally bordered on obscenity. Sensing that the sit-
uation might be spiraling out of control, the White House indicated its willingness
to accept a delay of up to several weeks for UN inspectors to continue work in Iraq.
From the perspective of Europe’s capitals, Franco-German unity and resistance
appeared to have won a concession from the United States.
Although publicly the war of words had been curtailed, behind the scenes, Chi-
rac, Bush, and Tony Blair battled to garner support for a future vote. Bush and
Blair focused on the new NATO states in Central and Eastern Europe in addition to
selected European Union members such as Spain and Portugal. Chirac, with
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Chancellor Schroeder’s help, took his case to the rest of the 15-member European
Union, to fellow permanent UNSC members Russia and China and to Iraq’s re-
gional neighbors Syria and Egypt (Charmelot 2003).
On January 30, the United States claimed a major victory in this diplomatic
contest. Eight European leaders published a signed statement supporting the US–
U.K. stance on Iraq in Europe’s major newspapers, arguing that ‘‘the credibility of
the United Nations is on the line’’ (Eight European leaders urge unity with US over
Iraq 2003). Although Chirac had regularly invoked UN legitimacy to buttress his
case for multinational cooperation, the letter signaled that the United States was
determined to shift blame for any damage inflicted to multilateral institutions to an
obstructionist France. Moreover, the letter, which had surprised the French pres-
ident, brought into question Chirac’s assertion that the French position reflected
European public opinion. In many of the signatory countries, political leaders and
the press on both the left and right had denounced American warmongering. All
eight countries had witnessed extensive public protest marches against the war.
Chirac was reportedly ‘‘stung by the pro-American backlash’’ (Bremner 2003).
Tony Blair seized the opening presented by this rebuke to try to bridge the
French-Anglo gap. President Chirac and the British leader met for an annual
summit at Le Touquet on February 4. Just days earlier, during a meeting in Wash-
ington, Blair had convinced the White House to seek a second resolution as a way of
mollifying France and Germany and winning allies for the coalition. It was sug-
gested that a second resolution would help Chirac to save French face and maintain
a role in any Iraq conflict. The London Times claimed that the French leader in-
tensely desired both of these things (The Paris Predicament 2003). At Le Touquet,
however, Chirac adopted an uncompromising stance and Blair failed to budge him
from his opposition to a war. Their postsummit press conference was marked by
‘‘awkward silences and eager attempts to patch over . . . a growing diplomatic di-
vide’’ (Sennott 2003).
Despite the failure of the Anglo-French summit, the willingness of the United
States even to consider a second resolutionFand to allow Blair to sell it to the
recalcitrant EuropeansFsuggested that the United States believed that Chirac was
amenable to a compromise. The action may also have led Chirac to believe that the
United States was committed to operating under UN auspices, and would therefore
be more willing than they had let on to make concessions to get the second res-
olution. Several prior events also suggested that the United States was flexible. At
crucial junctures in the diplomatic exchange, the White House made measured
concessions to the Franco-German position. A hopeful statement, a few weeks more
time for inspectors, another round of diplomacyFall came as a response to French
resistance. The offer of a second resolution suggested that persistence was paying off.
Taking advantage of the support that the US government had received in Eu-
ropean capitals, US Secretary of State Colin Powell made an appearance before the
Security Council on February 5. He delivered an extensively mediated presentation
of the case for invasion of Iraq, focusing on the presence of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction. It was heralded as a diplomatic and public relations success in Wash-
ington. Powell’s performance seemed to galvanize the US elite, press, and public
opinion behind President Bush’s stance on Iraq (Firestone 2003). However, the
speech did little to move the UN Security Council members’ positions. Several
countries suggested that all of this ostensibly rich intelligence that the United States
had gathered should be used to guide Hans Blix and the UN weapons inspectors
(implying that it had been secretly and intentionally held back and exploited for
propaganda purposes) (US report leaves world divided on Iraq as spotlight shifts to
Blix 2003).
On February 7, during a phone conversation with President Bush, Chirac
pressed his case that the world could ‘‘disarm Saddam Hussein without war’’(Iraq
can be disarmed without war, Chirac tells Bush 2003). The two men agreed on the
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need to consult regularly on their shared objective. Again, Bush seemed accom-
modating. Chirac announced later on the same day that he would ‘‘welcome a
second resolution’’ (No use of force against Iraq without second UN vote: Chirac
2003). Having opened the door to a second resolution, the White House began
courting UNSC member votes. Early polling of the membership suggested that at
least 11 of the 15 members of the Security Council wanted to extend inspections
rather than use force (UN Chief Inspectors head to Baghdad as French up resist-
ance to US-led war 2003). Chirac, via telephone, lobbied the governments of China,
Pakistan, Angola, and others. Bush also spoke with the leaders of the non-perma-
nent Council members.
On February 15, France scored another diplomatic victory. After weapons in-
spector Hans Blix delivered his progress report, Foreign Minister de Villepin ar-
gued that a decision on war was premature and that inspections should continue.
His presentation generated an unusual outburst of applause among the normally
staid Security Council attendees (Holloway 2003a). Surprisingly, France was joined
not only by the Russian and Chinese governments, but the British government too
when U.K. Foreign Minister Jack Straw agreed that Hans Blix should be given
more time (Johnson 2003). With indications that resistance in the council might
drive a wedge between the United States and Britain, Colin Powell’s response to the
council drama was muted. He refused comment on a proposal for the council to
meet again on March 14 and responded somberly that the members should ‘‘all go
back to our capitals, reflect on it’’ (Holloway 2003a).
Two days after the UNSC meeting, large antiwar protests were held in the capital
cities of Britain, Spain, and ItalyFall countries that had openly supported Wash-
ington (Holloway 2003b). Emboldened by the Security Council victory, buoyed by
the support of two permanent members and a preponderance of nonpermanent
members, and encouraged by the tone of European public opinion, Chirac stated
unequivocally that France would oppose any attempt to introduce a second res-
olution authorizing military action against Iraq (Summary of day’s events on Iraq
2003). On February 18, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin explained that
France was ‘‘not planning to isolate and to block [a resolution],’’ but to gain ‘‘more
and more backing,’’ and to look ‘‘for a majority in which we would win support’’
(France hopes to win UN support to halt war drums, rather than wield veto 2003).
Less than one week later, the French government, in conjunction with Russia
and Germany, produced a step-by-step disarmament plan to avoid war (Russia,
Germany to sign French proposal on boosting UN weapons inspections 2003).
They introduced the counter proposal to the Security Council in the belief that
US leaders were not committed to defecting from the UNSC, and that
French diplomatic preponderance could, at the very least, force the United States
to the bargaining table.
On March 10, a draft of a second UNSC resolution was also circulated. It listed
the signatories as the United States, Great Britain, and Spain. The proposal gave a
deadline of March 17 for Iraqi compliance with all previous UNSC resolutions and
indicated that, should this deadline not be met, military action would be authorized.
France reported on that same day that it would vote ‘‘no’’ on the resolution, but
Chirac claimed that this would not be an effective veto since Washington lacked the
nine necessary votes to pass the resolution to begin with (Knox 2003). Over the
previous week, President Bush and Secretary Powell had worked continuously to
alter the balance of power in the council by lobbying nonpermanent UNSC mem-
bers (Rival camps lobby UN Security Council members ahead of war vote 2003).
They had not been very successful. Leading up to the submission of the second
resolution, the United States had secured only four votes and few had shifted since
mid-February (Brinkley 2003). As Chirac was explaining this fortuitous voting ar-
rangement to reporters, his Foreign Minister was en-route to visiting the govern-
ments of the three African nonpermanent UNSC members Cameroon, Guinea, and
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Angola, to ensure that no surprise vote changes were forthcoming (French FM
arrives in Cameroon to win support against war on Iraq 2003).
March 13–16 brought the final flurry of diplomatic activity. Each of the main
actors made a last-ditch effort to sway the other members of the Security Council.
So unsuccessful was the US effort, and so frustrated was the United States, that
Secretary Powell declared that further UN debates were ‘‘without purpose’’ (Wash-
ington, in final stages of diplomacy, says UN debate now pointless 2003). He further
suggested that the United States might remove its resolution before a vote could be
taken and work from outside the international body.
The possibility that the United States would leave the Council and proceed uni-
laterally prompted the first sign of compromise from the European side. Desperate
to retain UN control over the process, Chirac offered to move up the deadline for
UN inspections by 30 days (Chirac could back 30-day deadline for inspectors to end
work in Iraq 2003). In response, US Vice President Dick Cheney appeared on
television to dismiss the French proposal as nothing more than a delaying tactic,
saying ‘‘it’s difficult to take the French serious [sic]’’ (Sanger and Hoge 2003).
On Monday March 17, Great Britain and Spain set a 24-hour deadline for ap-
proval of a resolution that would authorize force. France rejected the ultimatum,
and the United States withdrew the doomed proposal (Hoge 2003). The United
States had left the bargaining table. On March 18, President Bush spoke on US
television. He delivered a 48-hour ultimatum for Saddam Hussein and his sons to
leave Iraq. Chirac, in a similarly televised speech, condemned the action as lacking
UN approval (World condemns Iraq war, fears for civilian lives 2003).
Decision Options and Inferred Preferences
Naturally, this narrative must omit a great deal of the news that occurred from
November 2002 until March 2003, including the statements and actions of other
nations (notably the needling commentary that the Iraqi regime often directed at
the United States in response to council developments and global protest). How-
ever, it does provide a sense of the shifts in momentum and tactics that impacted the
bargaining process in the council. Figure 1 depicts a decision tree of the range of
possible outcomes of the resolution episode.
The decision tree focuses solely on the US and French options. Although Britain
(and to an extent Germany) played an important role, the central struggle in the
UNSC was between France and the United States. Although there are seven out-
comes in the tree, they can be classified roughly according to the general payoffs.
Outcomes A1 and A2 are those in which the United States achieves its goal without
compromising. This result could occur either through French acquiescence at the
outset (i.e., when Blair suggests going along with a second resolution at Le Touquet)
or by calling France’s ‘‘veto bluff.’’ Outcomes B1 and B2 indicate compromise out-
comes for the United States either multilaterally or bilaterally. These constitute a
settlement outcome, since a negotiated resolution would have delayed an attack to
allow for more time for inspections. Outcomes C1 and C2 indicate deadlock situ-
ations where France, alone or with other permanent members, blocks an authorizing
resolution, forcing the United States to decide whether to honor the council’s choice
or opt for an external coalition after clear UNSC rebuke. Outcome D describes the
situation where the United States, unwilling to compromise, opts to abandon the
UNSC process having been unable to buy or win enough votes. This action is taken
knowing that a second resolution will not get a majority and is intended to avoid the
problem of having to convince the US public to pursue a course of action that the
UNSC has explicitly rejected.
At the bottom of the diagram, we suggest the likely rank-ordering of these out-
comes according to the narrative presented. These preferences reflect our assertion
that gaining the legitimating support of the UNSC (on acceptable terms) was always
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preferable to opting out of the UN system. We additionally assert that France
wanted to avoid isolation, even preferring acquiescence to a ‘‘lone veto’’ position
had that situation arisen.2 It is somewhat unclear whether France would have pre-
ferred a three-way veto with Russia and China over acquiescence, since isolation
would have been less of a factor. Nevertheless, a three-way veto would certainly
have prompted a U.S. decision to avoid the council.
Simplifying the decision tree allows us to construct Table 1, a 2  2 strategic form
game with dichotomous choices for both the United States and France. Recalling
the preferences from Fig. 1, we suggest that US preferences were: Dominate
4Deadlock4Settlen4Submitn. French preferences were: Settle4Dominate
4Deadlock4Submit.
It is important to note that when moving to the 2  2 table, the United States
would prefer to terminate the strategic interaction, ending the game, rather than
accept the two outcomes marked by asterisks. France prefers all of these options to
the ‘‘termination’’ choice. The Nash Equilibrium and the nonmyopic equilibrium
from Brams’ Theory of Moves (TOM) for this game are indicated in bold text in the
table. The results suggest that deadlock was the likely outcome since the dominant
strategy of the United States was defection, and submission was France’s least pre-
ferred outcome. However, the deadlock outcome was not the most desirable one for
either actor and is Pareto inferior to settlement position.
Given that the ‘‘objective’’ preferences of the actors predict the eventual out-
come, recourse to a discussion of leader perceptions may appear unnecessary.
Should an examination of the psychological environment suggest congruence to
TABLE 1. A Simplified 2  2 Depiction of the US/French UNSC Bargaining Game
U.S.A.
France
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate US approaches UNSC for 2nd
resolution, willing to compromise.
France does not threaten
obstruction. US and France reach
compromise. (Settle)n [2,4]
US approaches UNSC for 2nd
resolution willing to make minor
concessions. France obstructs by
undermining US majority. US proposed
2nd resolution defeated in UNSC. US
must proceed with ‘‘Coalition of the
Willing’’ but cannot claim any
international support. (France
Dominates, US Submits)n [1,3]
Defect US approaches UNSC for 2nd
resolution unwilling to make
concessions. France concedes to U.S.
position (or backs down from veto
threat). (US Dominates, France
Submits) [4,1]
US approaches UNSC for 2nd
resolution unwilling to compromise.
France vetoes 2nd resolution. UNSC
deadlocked but France is isolated. US
proceeds with ‘‘Coalition of the Willing’’
but can claim international support aside
from obstinate French. (Deadlock) [3,2]
Note: Bracketed numbers indicate ordinal preferences for [U.S.A., France].
nIndicates that the United States would prefer to terminate the interaction rather than accept these outcomes. The
Nash Equilibrium and the nonmyopic equilibrium from Brams’ Theory of Moves (TOM) are indicated in bold text.
2 On March 5, several European newspapers repeated a story that first broke in the Paris newspapers Le Monde
and Le Canard Enchaine (a small investigative and satirical weekly). It contained quotes allegedly from a conver-
sation between French Foreign Minster de Villepin and members of Chirac’s UMP party in which the minister
suggested that France would never use its veto power since that would be tantamount to ‘‘shooting the Americans in
the back’’ (France using its veto ‘‘would be like shooting the Americans in the back,’’ 2003), although the Minister
later denied making this statement (French FM denies saying veto would be ‘‘shooting the Americans in the back,’’
2003).
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this objective referent, the result wouldFat bestFimply an overdetermined out-
come orFat worstFsuggest that subjective factors were spurious. However, we
contend that an explanation that accounts for both the outcome and the process
leading to it is preferable to one that accounts for the outcome alone. In making this
assertion, we draw upon the extensive discussion of the centrality of processes
and mechanisms to the making of causal claims, particularly in the social sciences
(Little 1991, 1998; George 1979; Salmon 1984; for counter arguments, see King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994). Of course, the introduction of subjective factors de-
mands a sacrifice in explanatory parsimony. Nevertheless, this sacrifice appears
justified along two lines of reasoning. First, a process-based understanding of how
the outcome came about makes greater use of the existing data from the episode.
Second, tracing the interaction and perception-induced bargaining tactics may
provide insights into the source of continuing postoutcome tensions. Attention to
process may increase our understanding of why the train wreck in the UNSC
occurred, and why it was so severe.
Concepts, Hypotheses, and Research Design
To transform the general propositions suggested above into testable hypotheses, we
use the operational code construct. As Walker and Schafer (forthcoming) describe
it, operational code analysis is a ‘‘self-in-situation-oriented’’ research approach that
is part of a cognitivist family of approaches situated within the broader foreign
policy decision-making research program. The decision-making approach to for-
eign policy analysis and the ‘‘man-milieu’’ concept trace their origins to seminal
works by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954), and Sprout and Sprout (1956), re-
spectively. Operational code analysis attempts to determine how a subject’s per-
ception of the political decision environment ‘‘orients and propels’’ the actor via his
or her preferences and choices (Walker and Schafer forthcoming).
Although the origin of the operational code concept is attributed to Nathan
Leites (1951), the contemporary cognitivist conceptualization of the term is credited
to Alexander George (1969). George defined an individual’s operational codes as a
set of foundational beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the effective
strategies and tactics to use in dealing with other political agents. George suggested
that assessing an individual’s likely responses to ten questions (presented in Table 2)
could identify the essential core of the op-code construct with regard to that person.
As Walker and Schafer (forthcoming) observe, these beliefs effectively operate as
‘‘mirrors’’ (with some distortion) of the ‘‘real’’ political environment as well as
‘‘steering mechanisms’’ that filter incoming information and shape the individual’s
preferences and future choices. As beliefs change, they may also reflect ‘‘learning
processes.’’
For roughly 30 years after George defined his questions set, the primary tech-
nique used to assess ‘‘answers’’ to these questions (for elites who could not be
directly asked) was to use at-a-distance analysis. This approach was typically qual-
itative in nature and involved assessing the sum of the content of the individual’s
written or spoken communication using psychohistorical techniques. Examples of
such studies, including those by George (1969, 1979), Holsti (1977), Walker (1977),
Hoagland and Walker (1979), and others, are extensively reviewed in Walker’s
analysis of the evolution of the operational code construct (1990). Occasionally,
quantitative content analysis tools were used. However, there was no widely em-
ployed systematic technique in use before the 1990s.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, advances in computer-aided text processing of
natural language prompted a renewed investigation into the construction of a re-
liable and systematic content analysis scheme for assessing the operational codes of
foreign policy leaders at-a-distance. Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998), in an article
titled ‘‘Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis,’’ introduced the VICS
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method. The technique has been applied in dozens of analyses (for examples, see
Crichlow 1998, Marfleet 2000; Schafer and Walker 2001; for a review, see Walker
and Schafer forthcoming).
VICS is a quantitative content analysis scheme rooted in social attribution theory.
It takes as its unit of observation the transitive verbs contained in the speech acts of
a particular individual. The grammatical subjects, verbs, and objects in these state-
ments, taken as a whole, provide an indication of an individual’s mental represen-
tation of ‘‘who is doing what to whom and how’’ and reveal his or her mental
representation of the political universe. Verbs are classified according to their va-
lence (positive or negative), tense (past, present, or future), and type (words or
deeds). Each verb, along with its grammatical subject (either self or other) and
object (for domain), constitutes a unit of observation that is combined with other
such units in the same verbal act. Aggregation of these observations allows for the
construction of indices that correspond to George’s questions on a speech-by-
speech basis.3 The strength of VICS analysis as an at-a-distance measure lies in its
reduced emphasis on the surface content of the communication, which might be
manipulated for instrumental purposes or audience effect (Larson 1988), in favor
of attention to deeper systematic patterns of positive or negative self or other
attributions generated by the speaker.
As part of their program to assess the link between operational code beliefs and
strategic behavior, Walker and Schafer (forthcoming) have developed a ‘‘theory of
inferences about preferences’’ deduced from an analysis of operational codes scores
and sequential decisions in 2  2 games. The inferences are determined from a
subject’s VICS scores on three key indicators of the op-code construct: I-1 ‘‘ap-
proaches to goals,’’ P-1 ‘‘nature of the political universe,’’ and P-4a ‘‘control over
historical development’’ or ‘‘locus of control’’ (P4a for self and P-4b for other since
P4b ¼ 1 P4a). These are compared with a norming sample of world leaders for
whom an extensive number of individual speech acts have been collected. When
the index scores lie above this norm, the index is considered ‘‘ þ ’’ for the purposes
of inferring preferences. Where they lie below the norm they are considered ‘‘ ’’
TABLE 2. Alexander George’s Questions for Defining an Individual’s Operational Code
Indicator Question
The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code
P-1 What is the ‘‘essential’’ nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of
harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
P-2 What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and
aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score?
P-3 Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4 How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in
moving history in the desired direction?
P-5 What is the role of ‘‘chance’’ in human affairs and in historical development?
The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code
I-1 What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
I-2 How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3 How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
I-4 What is the best timing of action to advance one’s interests?
I-5 What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?
Note: Key indicators in italics. Source: George (1969, 1979).
3 Details regarding the calculation of these indices are provided in Appendix A.
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for that purpose. For the P-4 index, a plus or minus one standard deviation nor-
ming range was set. If an actor’s P-4 VICS score falls within this range, it is con-
sidered ‘‘ ¼ ’’; otherwise, it is either above ‘‘4’’ or below ‘‘o.’’ The specific
predictions about actor preferences that Walker and Schafer provide appear in
Table 3.
To read Table 3, look at the appropriate self or other column to confirm the
appropriate VICS indices involved. Then, consult the ‘‘Values’’ column to deter-
mine the pertinent preference rankings given the values of these indices. For ex-
ample, if the self I-1 is above the norming range ( þ ) and P-4a is within the  1 SD
range (¼), then the preferences for self are: Settle4Deadlock4Dominate4Submit
(Deter/Reward). If an actor’s P-1 score is below the norming mean ( ), and his P-
4b score is within the norming range (¼), then the actor’s perception of the other’s
preferences are: Dominate4Settle4Deadlock4Submit (Punish/Compel). These
two preference orderings (the revealed self and the perceived other) can be com-
bined to generate a subjective strategic-form 2  2 game matrix.
Recalling the inferences at which we arrived from the bargaining narrative and
the decision tree, we suggested that US preferences, at least by the end of the
UNSC standoff, were Dominate4Deadlock4Settle4Submit, which conforms to
the ‘‘Bully’’ rank-ordering in Table 3. French preferences of Settle4Domi-
nate4Deadlock4Submit conform to the ‘‘Exploit’’ category. From this we can in-
fer some expected operational code index scores and advance the following
hypotheses:
[H1] If President Bush’s operational code indicators reflect these objectively in-
ferred preferences, his I-1 scores should be below the mean (conflictual), and his
P-4a scores should be above the average range (self in control) at least by the end
of the bargaining period.
[H2] If President Chirac’s operational code indicators reflect these objectively
inferred preferences, his I-1 scores should be above the mean (cooperative) and
his P-4a scores should be above the average range (self in control) at least by the
end of the bargaining period.
If the proposition that President Bush [H3] and President Chirac [H4] misper-
ceived the bargaining environment is true, then each leader’s P-1 scores and P-4b
scores should not reflect the actual preference of his strategic rival.
If the proposition is true that the ‘‘train wreck’’ was exacerbated by an over-
estimation by the leaders of their capacity to control events, then both Bush [H5]
and Chirac [H6] should reflect high locus of control scores throughout the dip-
lomatic standoff.
[H7] In a test of the mirroring capability of the operational code indicators, the
subjective interpretations of the leaders should fluctuate in response to devel-
opments suggested in the historical narrative.
TABLE 3. VICS indices and Inferred Preferences
Self Other Values Preference Order in a 2  2 Strategic Game
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b þ &o Settle4Deadlock4Submit4Dominate (Appease)
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b þ & ¼ Settle4Deadlock4Dominate4Submit (Deter/Reward).
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b þ &4 Settle4Dominate4Deadlock4Submit (Exploit)
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b  &o Dominate4Settle4Submit4Deadlock (Bluff)
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b  & ¼ Dominate4Settle4Deadlock4Submit (Punish/Compel)
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b  &4 Dominate4Deadlock4Settle4Submit (Bully)
Note: ‘‘ þ ’’ indicates above and ‘‘  ’’ indicates below the norming mean, ando, 4, ¼ indicate below, above, or
within the norming average range, which is P4a  1 SD. Norming averages P-1 (.28), I-1 (.39), P4a (.21, SD 07)
N ¼ 35. Norming averages courtesy of Mark Schafer. Source: Walker and Schafer (forthcoming).
VICS, Verbs In Context System.
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To test these hypotheses, we collected the verbal acts of President Bush and Pres-
ident Jacques Chirac that took place between the passage of Resolution 1441 on
November 8, and when the US president indicated his intention to abandon the
UNSC process by issuing an independent ultimatum to Saddam’s regime on March
18. Appendix B details the data used. To satisfy the minimum requirements of the
VICS scheme, we selected verbal acts of at least 1,000 words in length with sig-
nificant foreign policy content (which we determined to be 40 percent or more of
total words). For the verbal acts of President Bush, we relied upon the Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents available on-line in machine-readable form
from the US Government Printing Office Access website.4 For President Chirac, we
consulted a variety of on-line sources including the Official Website of the Office of
the French President and the US embassy in France, which maintains an archive of
Iraq-related news and public statements by French officials.5 We also consulted
Agence France Presse (in English) via the LexisNexis database service. The relatively
larger number of statements by President Bush compared with the number by
Chirac may reflect the fact that the GPO is tasked with meticulously recording all of
the US president’s public communication and that no such resource appears to
exist for the French president. However, we are reasonably confident that the
sample of speeches, interviews, and remarks listed for each leader represents the
population of codeable, foreign policy-relevant verbal utterances made during this
time period by each leader. For several utterances made by Chirac that were avail-
able only in French, we relied on a combination of machine translation and our own
cross-checked human translations to convert them into English. To conduct the
VICS coding, we used an automated, computer-based, natural language processing
tool (Profiler þ), using the latest coding dictionaries graciously supplied by Stephen
Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael Young.
Results and Analysis
In presenting our results for each leader, we begin with a narrative-centered anal-
ysis of the temporal changes in the key VICS scores (P-1, I-1, P-4a) over the four-
and-a-half-month period between passage of 1441 and Bush’s decision to abandon
US efforts in the UNSC. As part of this analysis, we identify the distinct ‘‘phases’’
reflected by the scores of each leader. Phase shifts reflect a change in the subject’s
perception of the political environment and his approach to it according to Table 3.
We determined when a new phase had been entered by reference to the VICS
scores. When a moving average score changed in such a way as to result
in a categorical shift in inferred preferences according to the Walker and Schafer
theory, we noted this as a phase change. For example, if a score shifted from below
a norming mean (o) to above it (4), or from below the norming range (o) to
within it (¼), such a transition indicated that a new phase had begun. For Bush,
the UNSC bargaining episode appears to be divided into five phases. Chirac ex-
hibits three.
US President Bush
Figure 2 presents, in two graphs, the P-1 and I-1, and the P4a VICS scores gen-
erated through the content analysis of President Bush’s verbal acts. The solid hor-
izontal line in the top graph (a) depicts the norming mean for P-1. The dashed line
in the same graph depicts the norming mean for I-1. When an index score lies
4 http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html
5 Chirac’s speeches can be found at the Official Presidential website at: http://www.elysee.fr/ang/actus/speeches_.
htm. Archived Iraq-related news can be found at the French Embassy site http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/
statmnts/2002/iraq_archives.asp.
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above this norm, the index is considered ‘‘ þ ’’ for the purposes of inferring pref-
erences.6 When it lies below the norm, it is considered ‘‘ ’’ for that purpose. In the
bottom graph (b), the solid line represents the norming mean, and the two dashed
lines delineate the  1 SD range around that mean. If the VICS score lies within
this  1 SD range, it is considered ‘‘ ¼ ’’; otherwise, it is either above ‘‘4’’ or below
‘‘o.’’
 US President Bush VICS P-1 and  I-1 Scores
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FIG. 2. (a and b) President Bush’s Key Verbs In Context System Scores: November 8, 2002,
to March 18, 2003
6 The indicator lines reflect a weighted, centered moving average (WCMA) with a lag and lead of 1 observation
of the VICS index over the selected time period. The weighting controls for the relative volume of codeable material
in each verbal act so that smaller acts do not disproportionately affect the trend line. We selected a centered average
in order to smooth the fluctuations in the index values. We believe that this is justified by the conceptual definition of
operational code as an underlying belief structure. By reducing the short-term noisiness present in the VICS
indicators, the centered average generates a more valid representation of the deeper trends while retaining in-
formation about temporal change, which would be lost in a simple aggregation of these data into a single VICS score
for each leader. It also prevents us from having to determine aggregation phases or decision episodes a priori.
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President Bush’s VICS scores indicate five distinct phases for the purposes of
inferring preferences.7 The first phase lasts from the November 8 passage of 1441
until roughly the start of the new year. In the first phase, the upper graph’s de-
piction of Bush’s I-1 index (his approach to goals) shows that it is distinctly higher
than the norming average. This reflects his above average propensity for cooper-
ative self-attributions (Z ¼ 1.06).8 Bush’s P-1 score is also generally (although
slightly) above average (Z ¼ .267). The lower table reveals that, for the most part,
Bush was also above the norming average range for the P-4a (locus of control)
indicator throughout this time (Z ¼ 1.323). The VICS scores suggest that Bush was
confident in his own control of a generally cooperative political environment.
Bush’s self and other attribution patterns were both positive.
Recalling the narrative, we could interpret these data as reflecting a post-1441
confidence in the support of the UN, the European allies, and in his prospects for
achieving his goals. After the events of September 11, 2001, the United States had
enjoyed broad international support for the ‘‘War on Terrorism’’ and activities in
Afghanistan. Little had occurred, thus far, to undermine this support. The score
could also have reflected Bush’s belief that the inspectors’ findings would support
the U.S. contention that Iraq had been building a WMD stockpile.
The second phase (B) begins in early January. The most pronounced shift ex-
hibited in Bush’s VICS scores in this phase relates to his pattern of self-attribution.
His I-1 score falls below the norming average into a negative position (Z ¼  .327).
Bush’s locus of control indicator also falls into the one-standard-deviation norming
range during the early part of this period and does not rise significantly beyond this
range by the end of the phase (Z ¼ .980). The scores appear to reflect growing
frustration with the nature of the Anglo-French exchange. His P-1 scores, however,
remain relatively stable at or above the norming average (Z ¼ .015), indicating that
he continued to view the political environment as cooperative. It may be that his P-1
index was buoyed by the letter from the eight European leaders that suggested that
some future cooperation from like-minded allies was still possible. However, his
negative I-1 scores reflect the erosion of his confidence in the utility of cooperative
tactics vis-a`-vis the UNSC dissenters.
The third phase (C) begins at the start of February and coincides with Blair’s visit
to Washington, the Anglo-French summit, Powell’s presentation to the Security
Council, and Bush’s cautious acceptance of the second resolution initiative. The
President’s I-1 VICS scores show a distinct upward recovery close to those in phase
A, as do his locus of control scores (Z ¼ .619 and Z ¼ 1.348, respectively). This
suggests that Bush’s confidence in cooperation was enhanced by the generally
positive diplomatic developments that appeared to have vaulted him back into a
position of control. However, the trend for the P-1 scores, for the first time since the
passage of 1441, begins to turn negative (Z ¼  .029), suggesting that the US
president no longer believed that the other actors in the political environment had
cooperative intentions. This downturn coincides with the mid-February diplomatic
successes of the French, including de Villepin’s applause-generating UNSC pres-
entation and the support provided to Chirac from the other permanent and non-
permanent members.
The fourth phase (D) reveals a dramatic turn in Bush’s VICS scores. His I-1 and
P-1 scores both plunge into negative territory (Z ¼  .890 and Z ¼  1.42, re-
spectively). Although less dramatic, his P-4a score also trends downward. Never-
theless, this index remains above the norming range (Z ¼ 1.51) for this phase
indicating that, even with the decline in cooperation, Bush retained a sense of
7 Phases were determined primarily by reference to the P-1 and I-1 scores since the P-4a scores displayed less
variability overall. However, when P-1 and I-1 were unchanging but P-4a varied, a phase shift was noted.
8 Z-scores are based on a comparison of the mean of the weighted indicator scores for Bush or Chirac for the
designated phase against the distribution of scores for a sample of 35 world leaders.
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control over events. Bush’s high locus of control scores in this phase and in phase A
and C lend provisional support to Hypothesis 5. The P-1 scores certainly reflect
Bush’s anger and frustration with French obstructionism and the diplomatic fail-
ures that the United States encountered as it tried to garner majority support in the
Security Council. His increasingly negative view of the political world is coupled
with a reversal of the cooperative tactics that he has previously favored.
In the fifth phase (E), both Bush’s I-1 and P-1 scores continue their downward
trend, reaching the lowest levels observed during this diplomatic standoff
(Z ¼  1.427 and Z ¼  2.735, respectively). In addition, his P-4a score also
reaches its lowest level (Z ¼ .506), placing Bush well within the norming range.
These scores suggest that the US president perceived the environment as one of
mutual noncooperation where neither side could claim to control events. At the end
of this phase, Bush abandoned negotiations altogether.
Figure 3 depicts Bush’s subjective interpretation of the strategic game for each of
these five phases as revealed by his VICS scores. Using the I-1 and P-4a scores for
self, and the P-1 and P-4b score for other, we consulted Table 3 to identify Bush’s
ranked preferences as well as his perception of the ranked preferences of ‘‘other.’’
We combine these preference orderings to produce a formal model of Bush’s per-
ceived strategic environment and to suggest his likely response (cooperate or de-
fect) during that phase.9 Having identified the strategic-form games in each phase,
Phase A  (I1 +, P4a >) (P1 +, P4b <) Self: Exploit, Other: 
Appease
Other 
Self Co Cf 
Co   “4,4”* 1,1 
Cf 3,2    2,3* 
Following passage of UNSCR 1441, the initial state is 
cooperative and Bush will continue to cooperate. He anticipates 
Other to cooperate as well despite the second Nash equilibrium 
at Cf, Cf. 
Phase B (I1 -, P4a =) (P1 +, P4b=) Self: Punish/Compel, Other: 
Deter/Reward
Other 
Self Co Cf 
Co “3,4” 1,2 
Cf 4,1  2,3* 
Although inclined to conflict (dominant strategy is Cf for 
simultaneous game), Bush believes that a hard-line strategy will 
result in deadlock. According to TOM, since the prior state of 
the interaction was cooperative, the nonmyopic equilibrium is 
Co,Co and Bush will continue to cooperate.
Phase C (I1 +, P4a >) (P1 -, P4b <) Self: Exploit, Other: Bluff 
Other 
Self Co Cf 
Co “4,3” 1,4 
Cf 3,2  2,1 
Bush has no dominant strategy in this cycling game. There is no 
Nash equilibrium. If Bush fears exploitation by Other he should 
adopt a hard-line position and avoid his lowest payoff.
However, achieving cooperation from Other provides his 
favored outcomes.  The TOM solution suggests continued 
cooperation as a carryover from the prior phase. However this 
game marks an uncertain period in the relationship. 
Phase D (I1 -, P4a >) (P1 -, P4b <) Self: Bully Other Bluff
Other 
Self Co Cf 
Co “2,3”   1,4 
Cf 4,2*   3,1 
Bush shifts to a hard-line position. Both TOM and Nash 
solutions suggest that Bush’s strategy is Cf.  He believes his 
opponent is bluffing and that Other will concede if pressed. 
Phase E (I1 -, P4a =) (P1 -, P4b =) Self: Punish/Compel Other 
Punish/Compel
Other 
Self Co Cf 
Co 3,3   1,4 
Cf “4,1”    2,2*
Bush’s dominant strategy is Cf.  The Nash solution suggest a 
deadlock outcome that is inferior to both players although TOM 
allows for nonmyopic solutions to Prisoner’s Dilemma.  The 
conflictual state of relations in phase D dictates the Cf, Cf 
outcome.
Note:  Payoffs indicate rank order from high (4) to low (1) in 
Bush’s subjective game.   Cells in quotes indicate the initial state 
of the game based on the outcome of the prior phase.
Underlined payoffs indicate the  outcome according to Brams’ 
TOM (1994).   * indicates the Nash Equilibrium. Bold text 
indicates Bush’s tactics for that game phase given his subjective 
perception of the payoffs 
FIG. 3. Theory of Moves Solutions for Subjective Games over Four Phases for President Bush
9 It should be noted that the ‘‘other’’ scores are not dependent solely on content in Bush’s verbal acts directed at
or attributed to France. To restrict the data gathered to such content would have made this analysis nearly im-
possible. Because the ‘‘other’’ scores reflect the total sum of other attributions, they may only partially reflect Bush’s
perception of the UNSC bargaining game. They may also reflect other conditions of Bush’s political environment.
This does generate problems from the standpoint of using VICS indices as a predictive tool, since the confounding
influence will only weaken the measurable relationship between Bush’s op-code and the specific instance of choice
over tactics we are investigating. From the perspective of hypothesis testing, the ‘‘noise’’ in the other index may
increase the chance of our finding an incongruence between Bush’s op-code regarding the ‘‘other’’ and French
preferences (or vice versa for Chirac). This noise should be considered when we draw our conclusions. However,
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we determined the outcome through the application of Brams’ TOM for sequential
game play (1994). For the phase A games for both leaders, we begin with the
assumption that the passage of 1441 signaled an initially cooperative position (the
game begins at Co, Co being the settlement quadrant). For each subsequent game,
the initial state of the game in that phase is determined by the outcome of the prior
phase. Self (the row player) is assumed to be the first mover in each instance when
determining TOM solutions.
Bush’s initial tactical choice, in phase A, was to cooperate given the ‘‘Exploit–
Appease’’ game interpretation presented and the initial state of the game. The
pattern of game payoffs suggests that Bush believed that his opponent would give
him what he wanted (his highest ranked outcomes) if he acted agreeably.
His optimal strategy shifts for phase B. Although still relatively certain that his
opponent would cooperate, Bush now believes that his best option is to take a hard-
line position and to press for his preferred outcome (his dominant strategy is Cf).
However, according to the payoffs of this subjective game, a hard-line position
would lead to deadlock. According to Brams (1994), players can be nonmyopically
rational with regard to move selection. TOM predicts that Bush would choose to
continue cooperation from the prior phase to avoid a degenerating series of coun-
ter moves that would result in an inferior deadlock outcome.
In phase C, Bush’s subjective game reveals a conundrum. Bush has no dominant
strategy and the game is without a Nash equilibrium. However, his VICS scores and
subjective preferences indicate that he believes that his opponent is bluffing and
that Other would prefer submission to deadlock. This arrangement of payoffs im-
plies that Bush could successfully threaten a hard-line position and, at worst,
achieve his second highest ranked outcome. However, the payoff from dominance
is lower than the payoff from settlement (mutual cooperation). Although Bush
believes he could force his opponent to submit, he would prefer willing cooper-
ation. This subjective game seems congruent with Bush’s ambivalence during this
period when the eight European leaders published their letter, Powell made his
presentation to the UNSC, and Blair tried to achieve a second resolution following
the Anglo-French summit.
In phase D, Bush’s perception of the environment becomes quite negative, al-
though he still feels in control. His preference orderings reflect his belief that the
opponent is pursuing a bluff strategy and that by using a bully response, he should
ensure compliance. This strategic episode coincides with the period in early March
when the United States began to position itself to introduce a second resolution that
would have forced the hand of the French to either acquiesce or use their veto. To
Bush’s frustration, support from the nonpermanent voting members of the UNSC
was not forthcoming.
Phase E begins roughly about the time when Secretary of State Powell suggests
that diplomatic struggle in the Security Council had become pointless. Bush’s neg-
ative P-1 and I-1 scores combined with his low locus of control values indicate that
the president is similarly resigned to failure in the UNSC. His preference rankings
as depicted in Fig. 3 reflect symmetrical noncooperative strategies for ‘‘self ’’ and
‘‘other’’ with neither in control. This Punish/Compel preference ordering in the
final phase does not perfectly conform to the expectations of Hypothesis 1, which
required President Bush’s operational code indicators for I-1 and P-1 to be below
the mean and his P-4a scores to be above the average range at the end of the
bargaining period (a Bully strategy). However, the inferred strategy for this final
phase is not far removed from the predicted Bully strategy. In fact, Bully was the
strategy Bush adopted in the prior phase (D), and had his preferences remained
steady (had his locus of control scores not declined), they would have been com-
there can be little doubt that the situation in the UNSC was the most significant foreign affairs issue facing both
leaders and it would be surprising if the ‘‘mirroring’’ propensity of their op-codes did not reflect this fact.
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pletely consistent with the preferences suggested by the decision tree and game
analysis in Table 1. One could argue that, rather than indicate his bargaining po-
sition, Phase E reflects Bush’s response to the outcome of the diplomatic standoff.
Such an interpretation would make Phase D the last strategic phase. From this, we
would conclude that the VICS op-code system and the Walker–Schafer inferred
preference theory were closer to success than failure in this regard.
With respect to the accuracy of Bush’s representation of the other’s preferences
during this final phase, our analysis of the decision narrative suggested that
France’s strategy would be ‘‘Exploit.’’ Bush’s subjective assessment indicated that he
perceived a French strategy of ‘‘Punish/Compel.’’ This is divergent on both the
dimensions of valence and control. This incongruence between Bush’s perception
and France’s inferred preferences lends provisional support to Hypothesis 3, which
predicted inaccuracy in the subjective representation of the opponent’s preferenc-
es. Interestingly, although inconsistent with an objective referent, Bush’s subjective
interpretation of the ‘‘other’’ strategy is somewhat consistent with Chirac’s subjec-
tive preferences as inferred from his indicators described below.
French President Jacques Chirac
Figure 4 presents, in two graphs, the P-1 and I-1, and the P4a VICS scores gen-
erated through the content analysis of President Chirac’s verbal acts. The solid
horizontal line in the top graph again depicts the norming mean for P-1. The
dashed line in the same graph depicts the norming mean for I-1. In the bottom
graph, the solid line represents the norming mean and the two dashed lines de-
lineate a plus or minus one standard deviation range around that mean. The
standards of determination of phase shift are the same as those we applied to Bush’s
scores.
Chirac’s VICS scores indicate three phases. In phase A, the upper graph’s de-
piction of Chirac’s I-1 index (his approach to goals) shows that it is distinctly higher
than the norming average. This indicates his propensity for cooperative self-attri-
butions. Chirac’s P-1 score is also above average. The lower table reveals that for the
most part, Chirac was within the plus or minus one standard deviation norming
range for the P-4a (locus of control) indicator throughout this time. This first phase
lasts from the November 8 passage of 1441 until mid-January. The indicators sug-
gest that Chirac’s operational code during this time period reflected an average
sense of influence in an environment that he generally perceived as cooperative.
Chirac’s ‘‘self ’’ and ‘‘other’’ attribution patterns were both generally positive. Re-
calling the narrative, we could interpret this as reflecting, as it did with Bush, a post-
1441 sense of support for continued UNSC involvement and, at least, no pessimism
in his perceived prospects for achieving a peaceful outcome.
Phase B begins in mid-January. The most pronounced shift exhibited in Chirac’s
VICS scores relates to his locus of control indicator, which rises substantially above
the norming range during this period. Chirac’s P-1 and I-1 indicators both remain,
as they were in phase A, above average and rise slightly through the end of January
and into February. The scores appear to reflect his confidence in the prospects of
achieving his goals and again lend support to Hypothesis 5, which suggests that the
‘‘UNSC train wreck’’ was rooted in an exaggerated confidence regarding control
over events. The new power arrangements in the UNSC, the support received from
the other permanent and nonpermanent members, and the outpouring of antiwar
public opinion are likely sources of this confidence. Conversely, the setback offered
by the ‘‘letter of the eight’’ appears not to have had an appreciable effect on the
French President, observations by the press notwithstanding.
Phase C reflects a dramatic shift in Chirac’s key operational code indicators
compared with the first two. Starting in mid-February, Chirac’s P-1 indicator moves
distinctly lower into the negative range. This indicates a pattern of negative ‘‘other’’
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attributions. His I-1 scores also follow this trend, signifying that he is adopting a
more conflictual posture. His locus of control score remains steadily above average.
The pattern suggests pessimism about the orientation of the opponent, and a de-
cision to meet this negativity with a hard-line response. Again, his high sense of
control reflects confidence that such an approach would be successful. Recalling the
narrative, late February marked the point at which France appeared to hold all the
diplomatic cards. However, the pattern of negative self-attributions seems at odds
with the public articulation of Chirac’s plan for peaceful multilateral settlement.
The indicators may in fact reflect his intransigent opposition to U.S. efforts to win a
second resolution.
Figure 5 depicts Chirac’s subjective interpretation of the strategic situation as
revealed by his VICS scores as they relate to the inferred 2  2 game preferences in
Table 3. Using the I-1, P-4a scores for ‘‘self,’’ and the P-1 and P-4b score for ‘‘other,’’
the table designates Chirac’s ranked preferences as well as his perception of the
ranked preferences of ‘‘other.’’ These are combined to produce formal models of
French President Chirac VICS P-1 and I-1 Scores
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FIG. 4. (a and b) President Chirac’s Key Verbs in Context System Scores: November 8, 2002, to March
18, 2003
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his perceived environment. Using TOM, we can deduce his likely strategy (coop-
erate or defect) based on this subjective assessment of the political situation. As in
the case of Bush’s phase A games, we assume that the initial state is cooperative
following the passage of UNSCR 1441.
The games for the first two phases reflect Chirac’s generally positive impression
of the political environment. In both phase A and phase B, Chirac’s payoffs from
the subjective game suggest that he would offer cooperation and expect the same in
return from his opponent. However, in phase C, Chirac’s pattern of ‘‘other’’ at-
tribution takes a negative turn. His self-attribution also trends negatively, resulting
in a subjective game defined by a pair of noncooperative strategies. However, his
locus of control indicator implies that Chirac believes that he has the upper hand in
negotiations. The payoffs from the phase C game show that Chirac believes that he
can adopt a hard-line position with impunity as he prefers deadlock or dominance
to either of the payoffs that would result from cooperation. Moreover, because he
believes his opponent will make concessions to avoid his least favored outcome
(Deadlock), there is little incentive for Chirac to suggest amenability to compromise.
In this last phase, Chirac’s subjective game of ‘‘Bully–Bluff ’’ leads him to adopt a
confrontational strategy.
Chirac’s subjective evaluation of the political environment suggests a Bully strat-
egy. This deviates from the expectation that we generated through the bargaining
narrative and decision tree. We anticipated an ‘‘Exploit’’ strategy, which would have
been consistent with above average I-1 and P-4a scores for the French president by
the end of the negotiation session. While Chirac’s locus of control indicator is
consistent with these expectations, his pattern of self-attribution is not. Because
Chirac’s preference, as inferred from his subjective game, did not conform to our
expectations, we must reject Hypothesis 2.
Interestingly, Chirac’s beliefs about the preferences of ‘‘other’’ reflect those of
President Bush somewhat accurately. In our decision-tree analysis, we suggested that
Phase A  (I1 +, P4a =) (P1 +, P4b =) Self: Deter/Reward Other: Deter/Reward 
Other 
Self Co Cf 
Co  “4,4”* 1,2 
Cf 2,1   3,3* 
Initial post-1441 state is cooperative and Chirac anticipates this to continue since 
any shift to a hard-line position would result in a deadlock.
Phase B (I1 +, P4a >) (P1 +, P4b <) Self: Exploit Other: Appease 
Other 
Self Co Cf 
Co    “4,4”* 1,2 
Cf 3,1   2,3* 
Chirac continues to act cooperatively and to anticipate the same from Other.
Phase C (I1 -, P4a >) (P1 -, P4b <) Self: Bully Other: Bluff 
Other 
Self Co Cf 
Co “2,3” 1,4 
Cf  4,2* 3,1 
Chirac believes he is advantaged and can adopt a hard-line position, which 
provides a better payoff than cooperation. He believes Other would prefer 
submission over deadlock. 
Note:  Payoffs indicate rank order from high (4) to low (1) in Chirac’s subjective game. Cells
in quotes indicate the initial state of the game based on the outcome of prior phase. Underlined 
payoffs indicate the nonmyopic equilibrium outcome according to Brams’ TOMS (1994). 
* indicates the Nash Equilibrium. Bold text indicates Chirac’s tactics for that game phase given his
subjective perception of the payoffs.   
FIG. 5. Theory of Moves Solutions for Subjective Games over Three Phases for President Chirac
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the objective U.S. preference was Bully ( , 4). Bush’s choice of strategy as re-
flected in his VICS scores was, for a time, consistent with this prediction. In the end,
although, Bush shifted to Punish/Compel ( , ¼ ). Chirac’s perception of the pref-
erences of ‘‘other’’ in his strategic environment was Bluff ( ,o). Although Chirac’s
beliefs accurately reflected the valence of the other’s behavior, he underestimated
the other’s sense of control. Since the issue of who occupies a stronger negotiation
position is central to understanding the UNSC ‘‘trainwreck,’’ the difference leads us
to accept Hypothesis 4 provisionally (that the leaders would misinterpret the pref-
erence of the other). Nevertheless, in all three instances, the valence of the inferred
strategy was correct. The decision-tree analysis posited that control rested with the
U.S. administration (since it could opt out of the bargaining). Bush’s VICS scores
suggest that he did feel in control through most of the negotiation, only falling into
the ‘‘equal control’’ range for phase B and the end of phase D. However, Chirac
appeared to believe, as revealed in his P-4a score, that he, too, was in control during
the latter half of the negotiations. Given the narrative analysis of events, in terms of
the UNSC diplomatic game, he surely appeared to be. Had Chirac’s subjective
preference more accurately reflected his limited control over events, the subjective
game and Chirac’s choice of strategic response might have been quite different.
Figure 6 reflects a modified phase C subjective game where the locus of control is
switched between ‘‘self ’’ and ‘‘other.’’ As this figure indicates, a hypothetical shift in
locus of control would have resulted in Chirac’s perception of the game being a
‘‘Bluff–Bully’’ contest in which the optimal strategy, given the propensity of ‘‘other’’
to defect, is to submit. Ironically, if Chirac had even considered his opponent as
having a level of control equal to his own, the subjective game would have perfectly
mirrored Bush’s in the final phase.
Conclusion
After the passage of 1441, the United States labored for 150 days, expending con-
siderable diplomatic capital and credibility, trying to convince the UNSC to support
its policy, to no avail. Tough talk to the contrary, it is unlikely that either Bush or
Blair were happy to return to their domestic constituencies empty-handed. Each was
left to rally support at home by claiming world supportFand blaming France for its
obstructionismFwhile drawing attention away from the fact that two other perma-
nent members and most nonpermanent ones were also opposed to an invasion.
Chirac too left the UNSC standoff with a taste of failure. Emboldened by his early
diplomatic victories, the consensus against the US policy in the council, and by his
ever-rising domestic popularity that had peaked in mid-March (Chirac popularity
at all time high over Iraq 2003), the French president failed to recognize the im-
minence of US withdrawal from the UNSC process.
While some have claimed that this result was inevitable, we suspected that an
explanation of the prewar debacle in the UNSC could be enhanced through an
understanding of the errant subjective interpretations of the bargaining situation
made by the leaders involved. We advanced several hypotheses that related to this
assertion. To test these, we began our analysis with a review of the events leading up
to the US decision to bypass the UNSC. This allowed us to develop a decision
Phase C (modified .)  (I1 -, P4a <) (P1 -, P4b >) Self: Bluff Other: Bully 
Other 
Self Co Cf 
Co “3,2”   2,4*
Cf 4,1 1,3 
Chirac would continue to cooperate hoping to avoid the submission payoff 
FIG. 6. Theory of Moves Solutions for the Modified Third Phase Subjective Game for
President Chirac
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matrix that captured the range of likely outcomes and allowed us to identify major
crossroads, turning points, and policy shifts that might be ‘‘mirrored’’ in the
operational codes of the selected leaders.
After the narrative, we focused on determining the degree to which the inferred
‘‘objective’’ preferences were inaccurately reflected in the parties’ subjective inter-
pretations of the bargaining environment using the VICS coding system. We used
the verbal acts (public speeches, press conferences, and interview remarks) of the
US and French leaders as a data source to build models of each leader’s beliefs
about the situation and their likely response to it.
Our findings were as follows: first, there was support for our hypotheses (3 and
4) that leaders had inaccurately gauged the preferences of the ‘‘other’’ in their
subjective interpretations of the political environments. This result comes with the
caveat that valences were gauged accurately (cooperation was correctly distin-
guished from conflict), and it was the critical element of control that was the source
of error. The two leaders seemed to systematically overestimate their influence and
underestimate that of their rivals (a finding that is commensurate with much social
attribution research). Second, as hypothesized, both leaders displayed an above
average confidence in their capacity to influence events (Hypotheses 5 and 6). We
demonstrated how, in Chirac’s case, this overconfidence could have led him to
stand firm, when submission might have been a better choice, in the final phase of
bargaining. We examined a counterfactual subjective interpretation where Chirac’s
control indicator was reduced and the game reconstituted such that a train wreck
was avoided. Third, we found that, at least in the case of Bush, using the VICS
system, we could somewhat accurately reflect the objectively derived decision pref-
erences via the subject’s subjective preference (Hypothesis 1). However, in the case
of Chirac, the two did not conform (Hypothesis 2). This unexpected result might be
attributed to the relatively small sample of verbal acts for the French leader com-
pared with the number we collected for Bush, errors in our translation of some
speeches from French, or errors in our objective determination of French pref-
erences as reflected in the decision tree and the 2  2 game representation.
In assessing our final hypothesis, that the operational code indicators of both
leaders should demonstrate a mirroring response to changes in the external dip-
lomatic situation, we must rely on some subjective interpretation of when each
leader viewed the situation as adverse or favorable. For Bush, the greatest periods
of adversity were, first, shortly after the UNSC reformed in 2003 with new mem-
bers and France hinted at a veto and, second, after the French–Russian–German
proposal and the protests at the end of February leading up to the mid-March
standoff. Both of these periods evince low or declining cooperation scores for the
US president in Fig. 2. For Chirac, aside from the eight-leaders letter, most dip-
lomatic events seemed to favor the French position. However, the French presi-
dent’s cooperation scores dip noticeably after Powell’s presentation to the UNSC,
when it became clear that the real power play had begun (see Fig. 4). Although
hardly conclusive, this pattern favors provisional acceptance of the mirroring ten-
dencies of the operational code measures.
In the end, our results suggest that one explanation for the events leading up to
the Iraq war is the human failing of hubris. It was the pathology of overconfidence,
as much as the irresistible push of some ineffable force poised to smash the UN, that
generated these inauspicious outcomes. More than anything, the train wreck in the
UNSC reveals how posturing, rivalry, and misplaced faith in one’s ability to control
events can generate myopic behavior with the potential for lingering harm.
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Appendix B
See Tables B1 and B2.
TABLEB1. Sample of Verbal Acts by President Bush
November 8, 2002 Remarks by the President on the United Nations Security Council
Resolution, The Rose Garden
November 11, 2002 Remarks at a White House Reception for Veterans
November 13, 2002 Remarks Following a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange with Reporters
November 18, 2002 Interview with European Journalists
November 20, 2002 Bush and Havel Press Conference, Prague
November 20, 2002 Remarks to the Prague Atlantic Student Summit, Prague
December 3, 2002 Luncheon Speech: Terrell for Senate
December 13, 2002 Remarks Announcing the Smallpox Vaccination Plan
December 31, 2002 President Discusses Iraq and North Korea with Reporters, The Coffee
Station, Crawford, Texas
January 2, 2003 Remarks by the President to the Press Pool, Prairie Chapel Ranch,
Crawford, Texas
January 3, 2003 Remarks to the Troops at Fort Hood in Killeen, Texas
January 15, 2003 Videotaped Remarks to the African Growth and Opportunity Act Forum
January 22, 2003 Remarks on the National Economy in St. Louis, Missouri
January 28, 2003 Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union
January 29, 2003 Remarks in Grand Rapids, Michigan
January 31, 2003 The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the
United Kingdom
February 6, 2003 Remarks on the Iraqi Regime’s Noncompliance with United Nations
Resolutions
February 9, 2003 Remarks at the ‘‘Congress of Tomorrow’’ Republican Retreat Reception in
White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia
February 13, 2003 Remarks at Naval Station Mayport in Jacksonville, Florida
February 14, 2003 Remarks on Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence
February 22, 2003 The President’s News Conference with President Jose Maria Aznar
of Spain in Crawford, Texas
February 26, 2003 Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute Annual Dinner
March 6, 2003 The President’s News Conference
March 16, 2003 The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao
Barroso of Portugal, President Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, and Prime
Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom in the Azores, Portugal
March 17, 2003 Address to the Nation on Iraq
TABLEB2. Sample of Verbal Acts by President Chirac
November 22, 2002 Press Conference at the NATO Summit in Prague
November 23, 2002 Joint Press conference with Rafic Hariri, Jean Chretien, Prince Saoud Al Faisal
Bin Abdulaziz al Saoud, and Ramano Prodi on Economic Reform in Lebanon
January 7, 2003 Speech to the Diplomatic Corp
January 22, 2003 Joint Press Conference with Gerhard Schroeder
January 22, 2003 Speech at the Castle of Versailles
January 25, 2003 Speech to the Group of Eight
February 2, 2003 Address to the Second International Meeting of Professional Culture
Associations
February 4, 2003 Joint Press Conference with Tony Blair
February 10, 2003 Press Conference at Elysee Palace
February 10, 2003 Speech at Elysee Palace
February 16, 2003 Interview with Time magazine
March 10, 2003 Iraq Interview with TF1 and France 2 Television, Paris
March 16, 2003 Interview with CNN and 60 Minutes
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